

**BEYOND INCIDENTS: SWEDISH COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN'S EXPERIENCE
ON CIVILIAN-MILITARY INTERACTION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY
INTERVENTION ON AID DELIVERY**

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Table of content

| | |
|---|-----------|
| ABBREVIATIONS | 3 |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 4 |
| 2. METHODOLOGY | 6 |
| 3. OUTLINE OF THE REPORT | 7 |
| 4. SCA EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES..... | 8 |
| <i>Increased number of actors and blurred lines between them.....</i> | <i>8</i> |
| <i>Origin of funding.....</i> | <i>10</i> |
| <i>Complementing or contradicting approaches.....</i> | <i>12</i> |
| <i>Quick-fixes paving the ground for corruption</i> | <i>13</i> |
| <i>Decreased development intervention creating pressure on those who remain.....</i> | <i>15</i> |
| <i>The impact of the presence of foreign forces on security of SCA activities.....</i> | <i>17</i> |
| <i>Foreigners are foreigners, and ISAF is ISAF</i> | <i>20</i> |
| <i>The Mazaar-e Sharif PRT experience, assumed common Swedish interests and double chairs</i> | <i>22</i> |
| <i>Making impossible the development state?</i> | <i>24</i> |
| 5. TENTATIVE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS | 28 |
| 6. REFERENCES..... | 30 |
| <i>Publications</i> | <i>30</i> |
| <i>SCA documents</i> | <i>31</i> |
| <i>Interviewed persons (in the order they were interviewed)</i> | <i>31</i> |
| ATTACHMENT 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE..... | 32 |
| ATTACHMENT 2: MAP OF AFGHANISTAN INCLUDING SCA PRESENCE | 34 |
| ATTACHMENT 3: PERCEPTIONS OF PROBLEMS, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT | 36 |
| ATTACHMENT 4: VISITING SCHEDULE | 41 |

Abbreviations

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|--------|--|
| ALP | Afghan Local Police |
| ANA | Afghan National Army |
| ANP | Afghan National Police |
| ANSF | Afghan National Security Forces |
| BPHS | Basic Package of Health Services |
| BRAC | Building Resources Across Communities |
| CBS | Community Based School (SCA) |
| CDC | Community Development Council |
| CGLP | Community Governance and Livelihood Programme (SCA) |
| COIN | Counter Insurgency |
| CRDC | Community Rehabilitation and Development Centre (SCA) |
| CRMO | Central Region Management Office (SCA) |
| DACAAR | Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees |
| DPO | Disabled Peoples' Organisation |
| EPHS | Essential Package of Hospital Services |
| ERMO | Eastern Region Management Office (SCA) |
| FOI | Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut / Swedish Defence Research Agency |
| GoS | Government of Sweden |
| ICRC | International Confederation of Red Cross |
| (I)NGO | (International) Non-Governmental Organisation |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| KMO | Kabul Management Office (SCA) |
| MOPH | Ministry of Public Health |
| MSF | Médecins Sans Frontières |
| MRRD | Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NRMO | Northern Region Management Office (SCA) |
| NSP | National Solidarity Programme |
| PHD | Provincial Health Directorate |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| QIP | Quick-Impact Projects |
| SCA | Swedish Committee for Afghanistan |
| Sida | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |

1. Introduction

In July 2015, the Swedish Government decided that Sweden's engagement in Afghanistan during the period 2006-2014 should be evaluated. The engagement entailed different actors including the military, police, bi- and multilateral aid agencies, ministry of foreign affairs, as well as civil society organisations such as Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA). The two tasks of the Swedish Government evaluation are to:

- Describe and analyse how the implementation of the overall engagement has worked over time, with a special focus on coordination and collaboration between development aid and military, taking into consideration gender equality.
- Describe and analyse the coordination and collaboration between Swedish authorities and Afghan authorities, other nations, international organisations, military, civil and local actors.

SCA, as one of the key Swedish actor in Afghanistan, has been consulted during the various stages of the evaluation, to be finalized in November 2016. Mid March 2016 SCA submitted a document titled *About the Swedish and international interventions in Afghanistan 2001-2014 – an SCA perspective*¹ to the Swedish Government evaluation team. The document is a summary of SCA's own contribution to, as well as the organisation's positions on Sweden's engagement in Afghanistan, based on statements, articles, press releases, reports, etcetera, from 2002-2014.

SCA believes that its staff in Afghanistan can give a valuable contribution to Afghan voices being heard on key issues related to the Swedish evaluation, as well as to SCA own documentation and learning on related questions. One area of special concern for SCA is civil military cooperation. This led to a proposal to make a minor qualitative interview-based study on this topic. The present document reports this study and aims to give input to the following questions (see more information in ToR in attachment 1):

- How has the presence of the international military forces in general, including the Swedish, influenced the short- and long-term conditions for SCA as an NGO to carry out development cooperation?
- How has the relationship of the SCA staff with its targets groups been influenced by the international military presence?
- Can something be said about how the international military presence has influenced the target groups vis-à-vis trust in development actors in general, including SCA, International organisations in general and the Afghan state.
- Did they experience any major changes in ISAF attitude towards civil society over the time between 2002-2012 – that somehow influenced the above issues? If so, any time frame, reason?
- According to their experience, how did ISAF presence influence their security/security of the programs of SCA?
- How would they, and in their perception the general public, differentiate between different nationalities in the force present where they were?

¹ The document was written in Swedish with the title *Om de svenska och internationella insatserna i Afghanistan 2001-2014 - ett SAK-perspektiv*.

- If the person interviewed has worked as program manager on a higher level regionally: Was there any initiative for collaboration or exchange locally from ISAF or PRT? What?

Where relevant, changes over time should be analysed. The scope of the questions is comprehensive, to say the least. It is however underlined that the present study only will give some insights into these questions, with the aim to stimulate further discussion and investigation.

SCA has been working in Afghanistan since 1980. SCA's vision is an independent Afghanistan in peace, where human rights are respected, rural communities are empowered and all Afghans have the right and opportunity to democratic participation in the governance of their country. SCA's mission is to empower individuals, communities and local organizations, primarily in rural areas and with particular focus on women, girls, boys and vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities, so that they may participate fully in society and influence their own development. SCA strives to achieve this by working closely with communities, local and national civil society organisations and government authorities at different levels, and by combining capacity development, advocacy and service provision as the organisation's approaches. The work of SCA encompasses programmes for education, health, support to persons with disabilities and rural development. SCA's work is based on the following values: Responsiveness, Equality, Social Justice, Integrity and Impartiality. About the last, of special relevance to the present document, the SCA Strategic Plan states: "While upholding the duty to be inclusive and non-discriminatory in our approach, we do not take sides in conflict and do not support specific factions or parties representing various interests in society." (Commitment for Change, Strategic plan 2014-2017 Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, p. 5) For a map of SCA's regional office and programme implementation, see attachment 2.

According to the GoS document "Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet", Sweden shall promote interventions of the international community with joint military and civilian components. At the same time, other GoS documents guiding the Swedish interventions in Afghanistan (referred to by Norén 2011: a; Norén 2011: b; Tham Lindell and Hull Wiklund 2011) underline the importance of separating civilian and military interventions, especially for the sake of the humanitarian but also for development aid. According to the COIN (Counter Insurgency) approach, officially adopted by ISAF in Afghanistan since 2010, armed forces are not enough to fight insurgents. It recognises that successful counterinsurgency requires winning the good will of the population or, as it was expressed in Afghanistan; Winning hearts and minds. In Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were tools in COIN, and hearts and minds were to be won through Quick-Impact Projects (QIP); development projects with a quick return in terms of winning trust among the local populations. These interventions were carried out along side the military so called Capture and Kill interventions. (Norén 2011: a; Norén 2011: b; Tham Lindell and Hull Wiklund 2011)

In a study made by FOI (Norén 2011: b), one of the conclusions presented by representatives from the Swedish military is that collaboration and coordination between military and civilian actors is a condition to reach long-term success in terms of counter insurgency in Afghanistan. In this as well as in other FOI studies (Norén 2011: a; Tham Lindell and Hull Wiklund 2011), it is suggested that the Swedish military appears to see more advantages with civil military collaboration, than the civilian organisations, including SCA, do. The "hunt for synergies" that

the Swedish PRT has been involved in appears not to have given the desired results in terms of for example sharing of information and intelligence between the military and NGOs. However, the alleged possible synergies have also been questioned by for example the Swedish National Audit Authority (Riksrevisionen). (Tham Lindell and Hull Wiklund 2011)

In 2014, Sweden made a commitment to support Afghanistan with 8-8,5 BSEK over a ten-year period. While the Swedish ISAF troops left Afghanistan by 2014, Sweden still has training staff and advisers present within Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Results strategy guiding Sweden's collaboration with Afghanistan states that "the purpose of activities is to contribute to democratic, peaceful and sustainable development, and long-term economic growth that benefits people living in poverty". (GoS 2014: 3) The Strategy (p. 6) also states that "Direct cooperation with the state should be avoided as far as possible." Although the discussion on the role of the state is beyond the scope of this study, it will be briefly discussed in the last section in chapter 4.

2. Methodology

The main method applied in the study is semi-structured qualitative interviews with persons from different functions within SCA programmes and among SCA target groups in Afghanistan. The interviews have departed from the persons' own experience, but have also covered more analytical questions, including some on possible future scenarios. The reason to sample from SCA programmes is due to trust and timing, but also to relevance of the staff's and target groups' experience and knowledge.

Interviews have been carried out in four locations: Jalalabad at SCA Eastern Regional Management Office (ERMO, covering Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman provinces), in Mazaar-e Sharif at SCA Northern Region Management Office (NRMO, covering Balkh, Samangan and Sar-e Pul provinces), in Wardak at SCA Central Region Management Office (CRMO, covering Wardak and Bamyan provinces), as well as at SCA Kabul Management Office (KMO, coordinating all operations in Afghanistan). Each location has had a thematic focus namely education in Jalalabad, rural development and disability in Mazaar-e Sharif and health in Wardak. Except from representing different parts of SCA's work, the locations have also been selected based on their characteristics in terms of security as well as in international presence. (See visiting schedule in attachment 5 for a detailed travel plan.)

In total, 36 interviews have been carried out of which 12 were focus group discussions. 41 of interviewees were male and 23 were female. Two interviewees (one female and one male) were non-Afghans but with many years of experience in Afghanistan. The interviewees include staff working in SCA offices, including managers and coordinators, and project staff, such as teachers, doctors and midwives. In addition, SCA target groups have been consulted, including health shuras, self-help groups, students, parents and Disabled People's Organisations (DPOs). (See References for a complete list of interviews.) All interviews took place in Afghanistan between the 22 and 31 of March 2016.

It should be underlined that access, especially in terms of security, has had a substantial influence on the locations as well as on whom it has been possible to meet in each location. In the majority of the cases, interviews have taken place at SCA offices and staff and target groups have been asked to come. Obviously, security and distances have limited who has been asked

and able to come. Some interviews were made with translator. All interviews were documented with notes. In the text, interviewees are made anonymous and in general indicated with function and/or geographic location.

Not only the location but also the timing of the fieldwork apparently influences outcome of the interviews. In the case of Jalalabad, the recent establishment of ISIS in some districts and its impact on SCA activities as well as on daily life of people, were dominating factors in the interviews. In all places, the fairly recent withdrawal of the international military forces, the closure of the PRTs, and the effects thereof has been highly influencing the interviewees' accounts.

The main source of information is interviews but the study at times also makes references to secondary sources for complementary information. One of the sources used is the Asia Foundation's *Survey of the Afghan People from 2015*, giving valuable information on Afghan's perception on security, national and international forces and economic development, with coverage in all provinces. In attachment 3, a collection of info-graphics from the Survey is made available. They are referred to throughout the text, to exemplify and illustrate information presented by the informants.

As stated in the ToR, SCA, as an international organisation is the case but it is trusted that the content of the report can be of relevance beyond SCA programmes. The study doesn't claim representation in a quantitative or statistical sense, but aims to give a qualitative contribution, giving space for voices rarely heard, letting people speak for themselves, and not just bringing the perspective of experts, or specific actors directly involved. During the brief literature review carried out for the present study, it was concluded that FOI has done a commendable effort in documenting lessons learned from civil military cooperation and information sharing, using the PRT in Mazaar-e Sharif as a case. (SCA has so far no specific documentation on this topic.) The documentations, however, include a rather limited perspective including mainly informants from the Swedish Armed Forces with one exception; a publication where NGOs, including SCA, were interviewed. None of the documentations include interviews with or references to Afghan actors or people.

Lastly, a comment on the interviewer and my possible interference with the answers. There are several possible "hats" or labels that I most probably wore, or were seen in, during my visit to Afghanistan, and that played a role in the way respondents answered the questions and chose to share (or not) their experiences; an SCA board-member, a former colleague, a Swede and a woman. This should be kept in mind when reading the report. In some interviews mentioned in the references (chapter 6), the topic in focus of this study played a relatively limited role, however the interviews did contribute to the overall understanding of SCA's operations.

3. Outline of the report

In the following chapter 4, the SCA and target groups' experiences and perspectives on the questions in focus are accounted for. The chapter is structured around a number of thematic areas based on the content of the interviews; to let them speak in their own right. There are extensive overlaps between the areas and cross references are made. The chapter is focused on concrete experiences from past and present, and reflections upon the same. Some sections, not the least the one on quick-fixes and the last on development state, also reflect upon some

possible long-term consequences, for SCA and other development actors. Chapter 5 aims to bring answers to the questions in the ToR, however in a brief format, drawing upon the content of chapter 4.

4. SCA experiences and perspectives

During the interviews, several informants underline the geographical differences, between neighbouring villages, districts and provinces as well as between urban and rural areas. They also underline the quick changes that constantly occur where a situation never can be taken for granted. This is important to bear in mind when reading the answers in the following sections.

Increased number of actors and blurred lines between them

After 2002, Afghanistan experienced a rapid increase in the number and type of international and national development actors, including NGOs, foundations and private actors from a wide range of countries present in the country. In addition, there was a less distinct line between the different categories of actors, as international military engaged in development activities similar to those implemented by non-governmental and civil actors. The differences were further blurred by the fact that private companies providing services to military actors registered as NGOs and that NGOs took on the role of the private sector. One rural development staff at KMO says: “The mix with the other NGOs make things difficult for SCA, especially the American NGOs. Almost independently of what they do, they come here and shout: We are an NGO!”

The same person mentions an American NGO that “made constructions for the military and at the same time they were hired by the MRRD to do third party monitoring for the World Bank in NSP. If NGOs can do so different things... [The organisation] rented a whole street in Kabul. It was full of armed people, if you enter there you will get afraid, you will think that this is a military base. But they call themselves an NGO.” Another KMO programme staff provides yet another example: “Now commercial companies are taking more and more contracts in aid delivery, causing another blurring of the line. Maybe they will take over the role that the PRTs had. At least it will fulfil the criteria of keeping the state out...”

While SCA staff believe that SCA still enjoys a strong identity and trademark in Afghanistan, they also stress that the influx of more actors, as well as the blurred lines between categories of actors, created an increased need for SCA to ensure knowledge and familiarity, especially among rural communities. One staff at KMO gives the examples of kidnappings: “We have had quite a lot of our staff kidnapped by Taliban and we see this as a result of blurred lines between different actors, and even between NGOs. However, negotiating based on who SCA is we have always been able to release our staff, so far we have had no incidents of killing.” Hence, the blurred lines have caused increased insecurity for SCA staff since they can, at first sight, not be separated from others. This has led to revised security procedures, decreased mobility of staff, especially in monitoring or supervising functions, being persons who are not immediately familiar to the local actors and hence are more likely to suffer security incidents.

Going to the local level this problem appears less challenging as SCA works largely with locally recruited staff with knowledge about as well as legitimacy among a broad base of local actors, including armed opposition groups. Another factor is SCA’s long history in Afghanistan. Members of a Health Shura in Wardak province recognise that lines were blurred with the entrance of more development actors, and that they had some experience with less serious

actors. They, however, claim that it has not affected SCA: “With SCA there is no problem. During jihad they supported us, we are very satisfied with SCA. Has SCA’s name been affected by the international presence? No, we have some good memories of SCA, for a long time, that SCA supported us during Jihad, they supported education, material, tents, because during that time we didn’t have houses. SCA has a very good reputation with the community.”

SCA staff express that it has been increasingly challenging, as well as increasingly important, to be faithful to and compliant with the humanitarian principle of impartiality. One person working in rural development programme at KMO states that “Most other development interventions seem political, linked to political interests, by Taleb. But SCA is an exception, they can see that we have positive actions and should be kept separate from the others. Taleb believes that many of the others have hidden agendas.” This should however not be mixed up with SCA compromising with the Taliban; the balance is as fine with all conflicting actors. “In Kharabab in Ghazni, the CBS after grade six were handed over to the government. Then the Taleb education director disagreed and said that he would only let them continue in school if it was run by SCA, he didn’t accept government schools. We delivered a message to Taliban through the community, if they didn’t accept the handover of CBS, SCA would withdraw all other activities including RAD. SCA is not compromising with its values. In that case we established an example and now everything is working well.” a programme staff member at KMO tells.

One staff member working with disability programme at KMO says that the increased number of development actors actually strengthened SCA’s reputation and name. “People see the difference, what collapsed with the luxury buildings, and they see that we still stay in the simple building, driving simple cars.” The statement exemplifies that many development actors had a high and exclusive profile, with luxury offices and cars, but with non-lasting programmes. With them leaving the buildings, little sustainable change was left. He continues by saying that it might even have led the government to appreciate SCA more: “They might not like what we do all the time for example demanding rights and services for people with disability, but at least they know we will be here, in more than ten years more.”

SCA staff claim that the blurred lines and risk for mix up have made SCA improve in terms of accountability, transparency and communication with local communities, as well as to improve the quality of its operations at an overall level, in order to prove that SCA is different than others. It has become increasingly important to show difference. The strengthened focus on accountability and transparency is also a key part of the rights-based approach as outlined in SCA’s current strategy. Concrete examples of improved accountability between SCA and its target groups are given by, for example, staff from the Community Governance and Livelihood Programme (CGLP) in Mazaar-e Sharif, organising accountability events with the communities related to infrastructure investments, going through budgets and spendings. Several staff members from the education and health programmes argue that it has become increasingly important with clear signboards at schools and hospitals, clarifying implementer and funding sources.

Staff give examples showing that the differences between SCA and other organisations, underlined as increasingly important with the increase of actors and blurred lines between them, can be in what appears to be details. Never the less, these are key factors in showing respect for values and beliefs of the Afghan and local community. One rural development staff at

KMO brings up the issue of interest rates in savings and loans programmes. Some INGOs have interests but SCA doesn't. "Then the difference is that SCA is on the right side, we are sensitive to the context and we have less problems. Those are small things making a difference."

Not crossing the Afghan line is highlighted as a very important aspect of being able to continue working in a context where many other development actors are perceived to be crossing it. An SCA health staff at KMO says: "SCA's core values are not crossing the red lines in the Afghan society. But that trust and understanding cannot be proved in 1-2 years, but in 30-35 years. There is a huge effort made."

Staff, however, also provide several examples on how easy it can be to be perceived to have put your foot on the wrong side of the line, like for example a person working in rural development: "When we started to work with NSP I got a security report from the managers saying that Taleb had written a warning, saying that he encouraged people to fight NSP because it was a government programme but that they should support all other SCA activities."

Several quotes above highlight the issue of time. SCA staff believe that SCA has managed to keep its trust with the local communities much due to the organisation's long history in Afghanistan. It has through-out the recent years of presence of foreign troops been possible to refer to history; that SCA has been with the Afghan people for long over 30 years and always strived to maintain impartiality.

An education staff member at KMO underlines that in order to ensure that SCA is perceived as and acts as an impartial actor, the diversity of its staff is key. "SCA works in very different parts of Afghanistan, and has lots of staff. We cannot say that there is no one paid by SCA who is not a Taleban, who is not government, who is not pro-European or pro-American, or even Daesh or Al-Qaida. But I as a manager I think that is very positive, from my angle I see that as the diversity, which is very good for an organisation like SCA. That paves the way for better work in the communities, better relations and communication. Avoiding diversity will not be healthy for the organisation, especially since we working in the very depth of the communities, in the rural areas. For example, if a teacher working in an SCA school is pro-Taliban, he or she will be very valuable to protect and safeguard the class. I cannot send a person from Kabul to do that. As long as our principles and values are not questioned, it is good. When our values are questioned, then yes, like for example when the Taliban in Wardak in some areas said no to girls' school, we say that if SCA is not allowed to work with both boys and girls, we will close all the schools. We have to have a clear stand. The important thing is that we understand the people and their living conditions. SCA has a very wise position in relation to the communities. I am absolutely sure that if SCA would have been in any collaboration with the international or national military, this situation would be totally different."

Origin of funding

It is believed that SCA funding, largely independent from funding opportunities that came with the international military intervention in 2001 and the PRTs, further helped SCA in not only staying impartial, but also to be seen as such. SCA staff argue that it would have been a greater challenge for a relative new-coming organisation to maintain this reputation. The issue of funding is highlighted by staff as an increasingly sensitive one since 2001 due to the lack of clarity in regards to origins and the strings-attached to funding. The question from where and

with what does the money come from regard not only the symbolic value of different origins, but also the differences in what the different sources demand in terms of “loyalty” with for example the country’s other interventions in Afghanistan, including military.

SCA doesn’t accept any funding from USA or related agencies, including USAID and the US PRT; a decision that has unanimous support from all interviewed staff. One education staff member at KMO says: “And I also think it is a good policy of SCA not to accept USAID funding. US is not welcome in Afghanistan, among communities. Even if they have given lots of support, not only to military but also to development. But still, people don’t want their support.” SCA accepts funds from multilateral and UN organisations, such as the World Bank and World Food Programme (WFP), as well as from several bilateral donors including Sweden, UK and EU. In general, SCA staff at field level, communicate to target groups that SCA funds are of Swedish origin; from the Swedish people, underlining no difference in funding portfolio during the last years. (85 per cent of SCA funding today comes from Sweden.)

Several interviewed SCA staff members have experience from working in other organisations. They underline the importance of SCA’s critical stand on funding sources and financial integrity. One SCA health staff at KMO tells: “When I was working for a US organisation, we were in a discussion with the US PRT where they wanted to fund a big diabetes programme. I said that based on the priorities of the Ministry of Health, and at the local level, diarrhoea is a much more severe problem. The PRT people got very angry with me and when I got back to the office my boss was also angry asking if I didn’t know who paid my salary, that I was supposed to be supportive of the PRT’s ideas.”

Several staff members mention cases where other organisations have claimed to work with SCA funds because of the SCA’s good name. One health staff in Wardak says: “There were other organisations coming with the military [...] they even used SCA’s name because of our good reputation. But the community didn’t want them. They didn’t want them because they said they were from the American people... But I don’t think that that influenced people’s view of SCA.”

However, SCA has also benefited from the increased funds available for development cooperation in Afghanistan. Over the period 2002 to 2014, SCA tripled its budgets. (SAK 2016) One staff member at KMO says that “It is a challenge for all organisations, like NGOs, living on donations, when there is money from a PRT to work in one place and not the other; what should you do? When there is an amount from one district... and then there is no to work in Paktia, it will be very difficult for organisations to be independent from the funding opportunities.” Continuing that this might not be a problem, depending on the conditionality: “As long as there is aid money it might be one thing but here we also had the mix between aid and military money available. So even if NGOs have tried to keep a distance, they have sometimes been forced into the famous synergies with the military, because that is where the money has been. That is a special form of conditionality, with the PRTs, different from the usual aid donors, which is problematic. It was much less problematic in the Swedish case, since we had Sida on our side and a strong focus on civilian representation within the PRT, but more problematic for example with the Americans where the USAID and military budget were less separated. It was all embedded in the PRT and they had military advisers at USAID. That was a big difference with the Swedes, they had civilian advisers in the PRT, and they cared for our side. Although one problem was that they were replaced so often, so it became like a constant discussion and

argumentation.” (One of the following sections below treats more thoroughly the case of the Swedish PRT.)

However, sometimes the decision not to accept US funds also comes with dilemmas. One KMO staff member says: “We will still not consider any kind of USAID funding, even though they do contact us and try to convince us to apply... And they do have big fundings that we miss out on. Like now, they launched a big funding for disability programmes, and then who besides Handicap International and SCA is really able to implement that in a good way... And we know that we could have done maybe the best programme. But still, it is not relevant.”

Complementing or contradicting approaches

At an overall level, SCA staff see no or little complementary between SCA’s work and the development interventions of the PRTs or of the international military forces. Rather, a long list of contradictions, conflicts and problems is brought up.

One of them are the different interests governing the development and humanitarian actions of the PRTs in comparison to SCA’s perspectives and approach. The PRTs, in accordance with COIN, were selecting the most insecure areas, where insecure means the ones with most incidents by, and/or presence by insurgent groups. One programme staff at KMO says that this: “creates distorted incentives; for communities it becomes an advantage to have incidents, those districts without will not be prioritised. Hence, the interventions will not be based on development needs and rights of the population. Doing development as counterinsurgency can almost become like encouraging insurgents.” Another KMO staff member adds another dimensions: “Also looking at ethnic conflicts and tensions. For example since the criteria is the existence of incidents and insurgency, there will be more to Pashtun areas than to Hazara in the provinces where you have both, like in Wardak. How has this contributed to the increasing tensions between different ethnic groups that we are seeing in Afghanistan today? The most problematic areas will not be those dominated by Uzbeks and Hazaras.”

The quick in and out of communities that characterised the QIP is believed, by SCA staff, to have had a destabilising effect. A staff member from rural development at KMO says: “After 2002 in terms of security things became more complicated both for SCA target groups and for, for example the site engineers. Others they just came quickly and spent their resources and then left. But villages became more insecure. It brought development to those who already had a lot. In the PRT development and military interventions were mixed. The criterion for development interventions was insecurity, or that there were opposition groups, those were their targets.” Several members of staff state that security became more complicated after 2002; during Taliban times the SCA security situation was perceived as more stable and predictable. However, several staff members also underline the need for caution in terms of risk of a certain “nostalgia” in relation to Taliban times. A KMO programme staff says: “Before 2002 we had the best security in the world at village level because of the rule Taliban.” but then adds “We should not underestimate what Talibans did against peoples freedoms and the fear that that placed in people.”

In Jalalabad, SCA staff tells that many of the so-called NGOs linked to the PRT scared the community since they were not separated from military. He shares the following story: “Like one that was providing stationary to a school and the children got so afraid that they started to cry.

But when the organisation reported to the US congress, with photos of the crying children, they said that the children were crying for our help.”²

The long- and short-term perspectives respectively are raised by several staff members as creating challenges for SCA in its programme implementation, being an actor exclusively working with long-term, sometimes apparently slow but sustainable, processes of change. One KMO staff says that: “SCA always worked with community contributions but then in the quick-fix projects, no one was interested in the rather long process of contributions and things were just handed out. That is also an effect of the international military – because their projects were quick impact.” This has made it more difficult for SCA to work with community contributions; communities are questioning why they should have to contribute in one project while not in another. (In development cooperation in general, and Swedish development cooperation in specific, ownership and participation of local actors are two of the key principles.)

Another contradiction between the approaches of the PRTs and SCA (as well as key international development principles) regards how to relate to and comply with Afghanistan’s own development priorities. One example was given above in regards to Ministry of health and priority given to diabetes and diarrhoea respectively. An education staff member in Jalalabad provides another one: “The PRT projects said that they would follow the policy of Ministry of Education but then unfortunately they didn’t. The government was very upset but then they were dependent on the PRT so what could they say? They just had to accept.”³ This highlights the perceived “supremacy” of the military interests in comparison to humanitarian and developmental; the military interests set the rules for the others. In terms of collaboration with and alignment to the priorities of the Afghan government, the Turkish PRT in Wardak stands out as a different case; having worked well with the PHD. (More discussion on this can be found in the section Foreigners are foreigners, below.)

Quick-fixes paving the ground for corruption

Several SCA staff members as well as target group representatives bring up increased corruption and illicit enrichment of the few, at the expense of the many, as one of the effects of the international presence, including the development efforts of the PRT and especially the QIP. The reasons are claimed to be twofold: firstly the aspect of timing; doing things under time pressure with a target on what to spend will make difficult, or impossible, an approach sensitive to the risk of corruption. Secondly, this risk is believed by SCA staff to be increased by the fact that many actors had limited knowledge about local conditions. SCA has itself had several cases of corruption, although it is working with an approach that is deemed less vulnerable to it. The problem is brought up as something that will most likely have a devastating impact on Afghanistan for a long time to come.

One SCA staff working within the disability programme at KMO says: “Through the way that the international forces and the PRTs implemented their projects, their money went to a few

² Several unfortunate NGO initiatives were provided by SCA staff. One such example was given by a staff member in Jalalabad. In one extremely poor district an NGO came and gave beauty parlour courses. He recalls that people had strong reactions saying: “We don’t even have clean drinking water, what are we going to do with this!”

³ It provides an example of the effect of placing all the eggs in one basket, but where some eggs are more important than others. Alike the health example, the military interests are placed above the development and humanitarian ones, including the highest level of government.

pockets and not to the people. They had high demands to get resources out quickly. I believe that also spurred corruption. And they were not in the areas where the needs were most severe. The way that they implemented their projects paved the way for corruption, but we had hopes that they would mitigate corruption, contributing to the Afghan systems.” An administrative staff member in Jalalabad is reflecting in a similar way, saying that “The US rebuilt trust in the communities that created the conditions for Daesh to establish”, placing the many small incidents into a broader and more long-term perspective.

An SCA staff working with the disability programme in Mazaar-e Sharif says that the level of corruption also puts at risk the trust people have in NGOs: “The many organisations and companies that came in reduced the respect that people have with NGOs, very much due to corruption. They came with less experience, and made trust decrease among the people. It didn’t affect SCA that much, people have trust in us. But if we don’t manage corruption cases well the same things will happen to us.”

A focus group of CDC members in Mazaar-e Sharif gives the following account: “During the construction of the community centre the government was involved in corruption with the contractor. Then we wanted to ask question about that but he wouldn’t answer, we asked why he never said anything. We said that if you haven’t eaten onion, you don’t need to worry about your breath.”

Although criticism is made in general to the QIP of the PRTs, the US actions are argued by some staff and target groups as worse than the rest: “Corruption in USAID project is very high and people see that, which has given a very bad name to USAID. People question the amount of money that has come that has just made a few people very rich and gave advantages to very few people, but with very little or nothing coming to the poor people.” one KMO education staff said.

Members of SCA staff reflect significantly on the unknown consequences of the increased corruption that they believe, but that is difficult to prove, has come with the QIP. On KMO staff member says: “One thing that someone should look into more deeply, that is difficult to prove but that we might have indications about is how the approach with quick fixes created a ground for corruption, how it paved the way. All of a sudden, with all the opportunities for sub-contractors, there was an explosion of construction companies with relation to governors and other high-level people. And then we at SCA pursue endless investigations of our staff if we suspect even the most minor corruption or theft, when we compare for example the cost for constructing a school in one area with the cost in another. In the quick-fix approach and massive investments in infrastructure, including schools, through contractors, there was no one who cared about the costs or who had time to compare, or knowledge about the reasonability of costs. We know how high the risk for corruption is and how much worse things are if you don’t have time and no knowledge. With the investments from the PRT there were so many construction companies that started, some of them called themselves NGOs. This created a ground for corruption, although it is difficult for us to prove it.”

As highlighted also in other sections, the Afghan people expected that the international presence would contribute to build Afghan systems and structures that would last, including governance. This expectation is however far from met. One KMO staff member states that: “Instead of slowly building structures within the state, everything was about quick interventions. And then you keep the Hearts and minds as a banderol on top of everything. There was a lot of hardware and

of course that pleases the bureaucrats to some extent, if you talk to for example Ministry of Education, they will also say that what they need are cars and buildings, and maybe less revision of curricula, enhanced quality, importance of teacher training... And at SCA, of course we also have to recognise that we as well delivered a lot of hardware, we also built a lot of schools. The most simple thing is always to build something, we know that. But even in those activities there has to be accountability and participation, but the military would never prioritise that.”

A Health Shura in Wardak says that corruption is one of the factors impeding peace in the country and when asked about who brings corruption they respond: “Some of the people who work with government. They are working for their own benefit, that is what is bringing corruption. There are people who serve unofficial commanders, outside the country, like in Pakistan, they cause corruption. Like with the airplanes that were donated by India. Someone took them and sent them to Pakistan. Pakistan wants to discover the technology of India. Someone is paid to send the planes to Pakistan but this doesn’t benefit the people of Afghanistan.”

Decreased development intervention creating pressure on those who remain

With the troop withdrawal and the reduction of international attention and resources directed towards Afghanistan,⁴ SCA together with several other national and international organisations have been a part of the campaign *Don’t forget Afghanistan* and one in Afghanistan frequently used slogan of SCA is *You can count on us. We will stay as long as we are needed.*

One of, if not the, main effect of the previous rapid increase in development interventions and funds available followed by a drastic drop in 2014, is the sharp reduction of employment opportunities. It is important to take into account that one person’s salary in Afghanistan ensures the whole or parts of the livelihood of a rather big group of people. Hence, the impact of reduction of employment opportunities cannot be understood only from the number of employment opportunities that disappeared. This is also confirmed by The Asia Foundation (2015), see for example Figure 1 and 2 (attachment 3) regarding the biggest problems at national and local level, where unemployment comes second in the former and first in the latter. Figure 8 (attachment 3) shows that there has been a drastic decrease in terms of the households’ economic situation.

The leaving of the many has created an increased pressure on those who remained, something that is confirmed by the majority of SCA staff and target groups interviewed in the regional offices. One SCA staff working in the disability programme at ERMO says: “One of the ways that the withdrawal was really felt was economically including the drop of the employment opportunities. It has become increasingly important for SCA to show that our commitment with the communities still stand, that the Swedish people still stands with the Afghan people. Both the

⁴ In the OECD statistics there are not yet available data for 2015. OECD statistics for the Official Development Aid (ODA) for all donors in and to Afghanistan (in USD) according to www.stats.oecd.com (30 March 2016) was the following:

| 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1309.77 | 1593.67 | 2311.49 | 2387.62 | 2961.67 | 4964.72 | 4875.67 | 6235.4 | 6471.94 | 6865.89 | 6666.89 | 5262.38 | 4823.29 |

communities and the government have expressed that they are afraid that SCA will leave as well. Like in Laghman in the provincial development council, we had to underline that we will stay. To be here daily, with impartiality, transparency, accountability. That made SCA almost come in a better position, in comparison to all those who left. But also, with all the needs and fewer actors, the communities want us to expand, but we say that we want to consolidate. Becomes a bit of a conflicting interests.”

In a focus group with two DPOs in Mazaar-e Sharif it is explained that before the closing of the PRT there were funds available for disability projects. The present DPOs had funding from Save the Children and WFP that they state was linked to the presence of the PRT,⁵ now the only available donor is SCA. An SCA education staff member in Jalalabad says: “After the PRT closed and all the US investment went away there is an increased pressure on SCA. There has been pressure for SCA to go into other areas, that were abandoned by the PRT projects, but that is not the way SCA prioritises. There is no NGO like SCA.”

The pressure is not only in general terms, but also in terms of which kind of interventions that are requested for by the communities but also by government agencies. Livelihood and agriculture stand out as the most desired: “With the withdrawal of several actors that were working with the PRTs and the increased unemployment, there is an increased demand for SCA to work with income, with agriculture. I think that should be a proposal for the next strategic plan, to work with agribusiness, to target the growing unemployment. SCA did work in agriculture but stopped but that was since there were other actors. However, here there are no other so it would make a lot of sense for SCA to work more with agriculture, not just skills training and business development.” an SCA disability programme staff at ERMO tells.

When asked whether the increased pressure implies a risk that SCA will not be able to meet the expectations of the communities, some SCA staff believe that such a risk exists. Nevertheless, they also trust that the participatory way that SCA’s strategic plan was elaborated, with vast stakeholder consultations, prevents some of the risks. The disability staff at ERMO says that: “What they [the communities] said is in the plan. The communities know that SCA is a bit slow because we are doing concrete things towards the sustainability of the communities. We are just collecting what they are saying and the communities know that. But of course some of the quick impact projects were attractive to them, like the one where they hand out or get access to cash, in poor area where people don’t have an income. But they are not very sustainable and the projects are over rapidly.”

The pressure on SCA appears more visible and partly different at local level and at RMOs in comparison with KMO. An education staff member at KMO says: “The PRTs implemented quick-impact projects, to construct a school, but SCA is not quick impact. Maybe in the future, and when security gets even worse, then expectations in SCA will increase, for SCA to cover for NGOs and for government.” Several staff members give similar examples where “covering for others” implies compensating for the decrease of other development interventions and funding opportunities for local civil society organisations. Another KMO staff says: “I haven’t experience an explicit pressure from above on SCA to take on things that have been left when many others

⁵ It has not been verified whether the funding came from the PRT. However and independently whether that was the case, the impression from local organisations is that the funding opportunities left with the closing of the PRTs.

are leaving... Although quite suddenly there has been an increased pressure from within the organisation to start to work with agriculture, with value chains... It was discussed during the winter management workshop... And at the same time as we have a strategy to consolidate within and between programmes, to concentrate and be more efficient, there is a rhetoric that SCA that is so good – why shouldn't we be doing more, and in more places... And we have also built our name and reputation to a large extent on big numbers; millions of children in school, millions of people served at our hospitals, hundreds of class rooms constructed... “

Several persons from SCA staff present doubts about the strategy, or lack thereof, of the international community in regards to the sudden drop in employment opportunities and its effect (see previously referred statistics from The Asia Foundation in attachment 3). With discourses on coordination and synergies between different interventions came expectations.

The impact of the presence of foreign forces on security of SCA activities

Asking SCA staff and target groups how the international forces influenced on security of communities, the response varies greatly between different geographic locations. To some, the question appears as irrelevant; not seeing how there could be any relations. In a focus group with midwives and doctors in Wardak the following answer was given when asking about the effect of international military forces on their work: “How it influenced? It had no influence on us, because we are doctors and midwives, we are not politicians...” One KMO programme staff member says: “It is the same as for us as individuals. For example, if I am on the road and I see a convoy of international forces I will back down, off the road. I don't want to be associated with them.”

Another KMO staff member says: “In one way we can say that SCA hasn't been that affected by the foreign troops, but more what they came together with, the package. We have met them along the ways. But there have much less foreigners out in the countryside than we predicted, of course some more than others, and some more involved in fighting than others. And of course we have had a lot of contact with them in the clinics...” He continues: “But of course the international forces have influenced how we think about and do logistics. But they haven't influenced what we do and where we do it, rather maybe parts of how we do it. And it has been important to us to put clear limits. They cannot come to us for water everyday... When the PRTs were established we feared that they would have a massive presence, with engineers in the field. But then they only had a small group of engineers inside the PRTs and sub-contracted all those who would do the actual work. The PRT engineers only paid brief visits. This was in many ways positive, and better than what we had expected... At village level I suspect that it has sometimes been unclear who has built for example a school. We build a school in a community, then a PRT comes and builds one not very far away. I believe that many would be able to identify SCA, but just be able to say that the other school was built by someone else, but maybe not be able to identify that it was built by, for example, a Polish PRT. But as I said, it was in many ways positive that the international military presence was relatively limited in the communities. But due to their zero-tolerance to casualties, they understood that they couldn't have small military bases around in the countryside. The PRTs became more of donors than implementers.”

Many members of staff say that they saw limited presence of ISAF forces, not only due to the insecurity criteria making ISAF work in different geographical locations than SCA, but also since SCA is working in rather remote districts, where ISAF has had less presence. However, also the

short presence is said to have caused security threats to development work, as one KMO programme staff puts it: "But through their presence, short term and ad-hoc they had a destabilizing effect since they became a point of attraction for the insurgency. If they are standing next to a school, that will not improve people's sense of security or sending their children to that school. The case is the same with hospitals; having military posts close to them will reduce adherence, and especially for women." A health staff at KMO says when discussing female adherence to midwifery services at the clinics: "My impression is that the check-points close to the clinics, both national and international, do not at all provide security for the clinics."

However, other staff at KMO as well as in ERMO and NRM0 (but not in CRMO) argue that in some context, the check-points can have a positive effect on school and hospital security. (See Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6 in attachment 3 respectively for illustrations of the different perceptions on what/who provides security.) In CRMO, no positive experiences of checkpoints close to clinics and hospitals were encountered. The Health Shura from Wardak says: "The people were worried about the check-point since it means an increased risk of fighting so the clinic is affected by that. The checkpoint was first established several years ago. The checkpoint used to fetch water at the clinic but they have asked them to stop, one of the reasons why Taliban placed a bomb by the clinic is that they said that it was helping the military. But during mujahedeen there was no check-point, but with Karzai it was established again." A CRMO health staff adds that the Taliban landed a land-mine in the clinic because the military went there to fetch water.

Protection of girls' access to education has been one of the rationales of the presence of international forces. When asked about that in particular, a KMO education staff member gives the following account: "That depends a lot on the situation, whether the international forces have contributed to increased security. If the schools are protected, and real security is being provided, people will send their children to school. But unfortunately, in Afghanistan and in particular in conflict situation, that has gone wrong. They have supported local militias, which by people are perceived as much worse than Taliban. Then people prefer to not have any international or national military forces. They just want to be safe. But it is very different from place to place. The impact of the Swedish forces for example in Mazaar was good, but looking at the situation in Wardak... However, also in Mazaar things got worse quite fast, and people had other expectations. However, in some areas the situation remains good, which is good for the image of the forces..." The issue of deterioration of security related to the recent withdrawal of the international troops will be elaborated upon later in this section.

While education gives a mixed picture, SCA health staff and target groups are the ones most critical to the international forces. They provide a large number of examples on how the presence and actions of the international forces have impacted negatively on access to health, providing no positive example. A CRMO health programme staff says: "I don't see that SCA has had any support from the presence of the special forces. Just problems. Like the two incidents in Zaidabad, that was Taliban attacking but that was because of the presence of the special forces. They placed their office next to the clinic and the Taliban wanted to abolish their office. There are so many incidents in the clinics so I don't remember them all." He continues: "After the incidents the visiting rates go down immediately after incidents but then they usually recover quite fast. But the problem we face after the last incident is that the surgeon has resigned. There is no one who wants to go to this district, it is too insecure... The one that we had was not 100 per cent good, but at least we had one. So now we are trying to recruit a new one but that will not

be easy, that district has been without surgeon for very long time before this one came.” The quote regards a 2016 incident, hence beyond the timeframe of the study as well as of the Swedish Government evaluation. It does however exemplify a sequence of events contributing to the threats on health facilities in Wardak province and the difficulty to recruit staff as an effect of this. Other negative impacts of attacks on recruitments are reported, such as from Laghman where SCA has lost a number of female health workers due to security deterioration.

An SCA physiotherapist working in Zaidabad district, Wardak province, tells how the fact that there was an American base just next to the clinic caused serious harm, including from the clinic being damaged when Taliban attacked the American base. SCA has suffered a substantial amount of attacks on its health facilities, several of them in Wardak. (For more examples, see for example SAK 2016, for a comprehensive discussion on the latest SCA Wardak incident and the MSF Kunduz incident (as mentioned above, outside the timeframe of the present study but still deemed as of relevance), see for example AAN 2016.) SCA has since several years back been cooperating with other NGOs also working in health on the issue of health care in danger. The support from the international community as well as from the Afghan government has been hesitant, to say the least. SCA express harsh criticism that neither foreign nor domestic governmental actors have stood up for the basic principles of the Geneva Convention. This issue will also be discussed in the section on The Mazaar-e Sharif PRT experience.

Several SCA staff members highlight the need to separate security for whom – there is not necessarily a direct relation between for example SCA KMO or RMO staff being able to go to a project and the target groups’ experiences of deteriorating security. One KMO health staff says: “It is important to separate different dimensions of security; for the local midwives and for me who come as an outsider. Just because it is more insecure for me, it doesn’t mean that it is necessary more insecure for them. In the case of the midwives there is a strong belief among Talebs that they need them. We gained the trust through providing services. In 2004, 9 per cent of the health facilities had standard delivery room, now they all have it.”

Below an excerpt from a conversation with a group of members of the Health Shura in Wardak giving an example of the experience of international forces in their daily life: Q: Did you have international forces present in your village? “We had international forces in our district for several years. When they were here the security was bad. Women and children couldn’t go out, they felt threatened by the risk of violence. When they left, the situation is better. Now it is better, there is less fighting. When they saw four to five people in a group they through a bomb. Just like that, at anyone.”

Q: Was it possible to have any dialogue with them, to try to influence them? “They didn’t allow dialogue with anyone. They were Americans. There were American forces and an Afghan man called Zakaria who was with them, he was a very very bad man, from Kandahar. They killed a lot of people, Zakaria also did that. But then he was hurt in Kabul, as a revenge for what he did here. A very bad man.”

Q: Did this behaviour cause people to have more sympathy with Taliban? “It doesn’t necessarily make people support Taliban, but it made us very disappointed with government. But not necessarily joining Taliban.”

Q: Who is perceived to bring safety? “People want dialogue with Taliban and avoid corruption, this is what will bring peace. Then we will have peace.”

The survey of The Asia Foundation (see Figure 3, 7 and 9 in attachment 3) shows there little confidence that people in Wardak province has in the international forces as providers of security, as well as the relatively high sympathy that the population has for armed opposition groups.

A physiotherapist working at a district clinic in Wardak, says “The location [of the clinic] is very insecure, but fortunately inside the clinic the environment is very good. The Taliban are there but they don’t touch us, they are rather supporting us. They are not a threat to our work.”

Teachers at the CRDC in Mazaar-e Sharif also underline the importance of the sites of activities to be perceived as safe places. Through high level of trust among parents the CRDC is viewed as a safe place: “The school is viewed by parents as a safe place, hence even with threats they will try to send their children to school because it is safe here, and they trust that we take well care of their children.” The same group of teachers state that to them the: “International forces didn’t have much impact on security... But rather on employment, now it is going down, people are frustrated because employment opportunities are reduced.”

In general, interviewees refer to deteriorating security situation during and after the recent withdrawal of international troops, also in the areas that were for a long time perceived as safe. However, when asked whether they perceive this as a result of the international forces leaving, the answer is not so clear. In the cases where the international forces were seen as contributing to security, SCA staff reflect upon how little capacity was left with the Afghan counterparts. One of the areas where security has been relatively good for a significant time is northern Afghanistan, including Balkh province. However, it is one of the places where SCA staff and target groups are giving many example of recent deterioration in security. One CDC focus group in Mazaar-e Sharif says: “Sholgari is one of the districts where they have two commanders, one Arab and one Uzbek, fighting and the population comes in between them, last week there were even two people killed in fighting, and 5-6 injured. They had some presence of foreign troops in Sholgari and believe that they at least managed to keep some control, there were not so many outbreaks of conflicts between local commanders.” SCA NRMO disability field supervisors give a similar account: “Security deteriorated when the ISAF forces left, many districts are not secure anymore. Maybe not that they provided security, but they made people fear them so the commanders didn’t fight due to the fear or risk of international intervention.”

Foreigners are foreigners, and ISAF is ISAF

When SCA staff members discuss the nationality of the different international military forces and PRTs, the tendency can very simplified be described as follows (which has to some extent already become visible in the quotes above): The Americans are largely viewed as separate and by most people in the negative sense; the least wanted, the least respecting and with (American) NGOs acting as puppets for military and political interests, not following the humanitarian principles. On the other side; the positive there is Turkey that is described as more accepted mostly because of the fact that they come from another Muslim country.⁶ In between these poles

⁶ In 2002, the SCA board made the following statement: “SAK inser behovet av internationell militär närvaro, men detta bör i så fall utgöras av en FN-ledd styrka. Helst med stort deltagande av muslimska stater.” Suggesting that Afghanistan needs support from international military but that it should be led by the UN and with a strong participation from Muslim states. (Referred in SAK 2016: 21)

we find “the rest”; those who don’t differ too much between each other. A number of quotes below highlight the tendency.

“To most Afghans, ISAF is ISAF, foreigners are foreigners, independently of where they come from. But of course people in the city of Mazaar will maybe know that the PRT there was Swedish. But no one in Wardak knows that the PRT in Mazaar was Swedish.” (Programme staff at KMO)

“On the ground people are not so aware of the differences between the different nationalities of the international forces and PRTs. Maybe the most distinguished is the Turkish and America. Turkey easily got accepted, they are also Muslim people. But then if others are German, American, Swedish – they are all of them ISAF. Even though Turkey is a part of NATO, but different.” (KMO education programme staff)

“As we said before, it is not so much about where you come from but whether you are American or not... In most of the provinces we had no collaboration with the PRTs, in some of them to share some information to avoid incidents, but mostly no collaboration at all. In the places where we have health programme, like Wardak and Laghman we had some contacts because of all the incidents... But there are different approached between also the more likeminded NGOs in regards to this, [organisation A] considered a collaboration with [company X] which is a private company implementing several large-scale USAID projects.” (SCA staff at KMO)

“The experience from the Turkish PRT in Maidan-Shar was positive, they constructed some things inside the hospital, they also supported health workers with trainings. They coordinated with the PHD, so that was not a problem. But of course they didn’t give their money to the government, but they coordinated with them.” (KMO health programme staff)

“They [the Turkish PRT] constructed clinics, and they always had the PHD in the picture, a good collaboration. The Turkish PRT was seen as separate from the military forces.” (Health staff at CRMO)

“... the Turkish PRT as accepted by the people, they are also Muslim, maybe that is why it is easier to accept. Very different from the attitudes towards the Americans.” (Hospital Director Wardak)

“The community trusted the Turkish forces. The people in the cities trust the international forces more, but the people living in the mountains don’t. People in the mountains have a relationship with Talebans, and the government forces or the government has never done anything for them. They are not included in any programme, they are excluded. But everyone just wants security.” (Focus group of midwives and doctors in Wardak)

“The PRT here was Turkish and Turkey is a member of NATO but here they worked with development. They had some forces but that was mostly for their own security, they were not fighting Taliban. It is not that I am against America, but this is the reality... In the recent attack of the Zaidabad clinic several people from the staff confirm that they heard English word, coming from foreigners, they were not all Afghans.” (SCA Health programme staff Wardak)

Thus, it is difficult for many to for example separate the Swedish forces from other nationalities, except from the obvious geographic distinction. Sweden, however, was not the only nation present in the northern provinces. Nevertheless, when discussing the Swedish presence in the

north, there are some differences made, as we will see in the coming section. (See last footnote on SCA stand on the need for strong participation of Muslim state in the UN intervention.)

While for example the Asia Foundation's surveys (with some examples in attachment 3) provide valuable information on the trust that different actors of the ANSF enjoy, there is a lack of data compared over a long period of time on the Afghan people's perception on international military forces over time. The brief literature review carried out within the framework of the assignment seems to suggest that there is an information gap in regards to this.

The Mazaar-e Sharif PRT experience, assumed common Swedish interests and double chairs

The sections above treat SCA experience from international military forces and PRTs in general. Looking specifically at the case with the partly Swedish PRT in Mazaar-e Sharif, the picture becomes in some aspects slightly different.

The Swedish Government has formulated the political goal for participation in international peace- and security promoting interventions to "to increase the conditions for a joint civil and military action in the areas of intervention where Sweden is participating".⁷ SCA chose not to be a partner in the military's interventions, whether under the umbrella of the Swedish or other PRTs. This since SCA saw the international military forces as one of the warring parties in the conflict, and a partnership would seriously damage SCA's trust in the Afghan society in general, and in the local communities in specific.

While the Swedish government wanted an approximation between military and development intervention, SCA's position was well understood by Sida. SCA accepted to expand its activities geographically in the northern region, within programmatic areas already a part of SCA's strategies and priorities. This came with no demands on civil-military collaboration. Between 2008 and 2010, SCA implemented the Northern Development Project (NDP) followed by Northern Rural Project (NRP) in Balkh, Samangan and Sar-e Pul. The programme was aligned with SCA policy as well as the policies guiding Swedish development cooperation. The programmes have components similar to those of NSP. (SAK 2016)

The Swedish PRT was different from other PRT in the sense that the PRT didn't have its own development cooperation funds, but instead a Sida employed development cooperation adviser, based in Mazar-e Sharif. The existence of civilian representatives at the PRT is believed by SCA staff to have had an substantial impact, as one staff member who was present during the negotiations between SCA and Sida/the Swedish Embassy phrases it: "During our negotiations with the [Swedish] embassy it was important that there was a civil representative from the PRT present. That made it a lot easier to explain the need for the distinction. The civil representative made a lot of difference since he was on our side."

The Swedish military expressed interest in participating in for example inaugurations of SCA construction project but SCA rejected. When the Swedish government formulated the strategies for synergies between military and civilian interventions (see brief comment in the introduction as well as several references for more information), there was increased pressure also from Sida

⁷ Translated from Swedish from: Helene Lackenbauer. Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan i Afghanistan. FOI Memo 3793. 2011.

to ensure an increased Swedish visibility. Some discussions regarding contractual relationships took place. SCA remained a firm position of separation, including no presence of the Swedish military at inaugurations and other activities.

As mentioned above, FOI has published a series of lessons learned document on civil military collaboration with the PRT in Mazaar-e Sharif as one example. There appears to be a tone of “disappointment” or lost opportunity expressed from the side of the Swedish military in terms of for example information sharing between NGOs such as SCA, and the Swedish military. (See Norén 2011: a; Norén 2011: b; Tham Lindell and Hull Wiklund 2011) However, all the interviewed SCA employees confirm that they do not see any other option than the approach chosen; to refuse all attachments, be them organisational, financial or in terms of joint events, with the military. They do not separate the case with the PRT in Mazaar-e Sharif from the other PRTs with other countries as their hosts. As the previous section brought up, there is no indication that the Swedish forces were separated in Afghan people’s general perception of the different ISAF nationalities. As highlighted in several quotes above, SCA staff as a collective appears as convinced that SCA would not have been able to continue its work in the same way in Afghanistan, would they have had any collaboration with the military, independently of nationality. It is believed that the legitimacy and long history would have been ruined by such collaboration. All possible means have been used to increase clarity on origins of funds and SCA stance on the humanitarian principles as non-negotiable.

The outcome of the interviews in Mazaar-e Sharif, with SCA staff and target group, differ to some extent in the sense that there are no examples of the kind of violations of for example the Geneva Conventions in terms of intrusion into health facilities, or summary attacks on communities as heard of in other places (especially from Wardak). In general, the interviewed in Mazaar-e Sharif also have a more positive stance on for example the existence of check-points of different forms (police and military), than in several other place. (See Figure 4, 5 and 9 in attachment 3 for an overview of trust put in different security providing actors.)

While the majority of informants confirmed a relatively secure environment and stability during the presence of the ISAF forces in Mazaar-e Sharif, the long-term impact and the sustainability of the difference is being questioned since security is deteriorating in several districts. An SCA rural development staff says that: “Security is deteriorating in the north, districts and villages that we thought were safe are not anymore. This causes delays and changes in SCA implementation. The places became insecure.” The same person says: “In some places it is due to local commanders that are fighting in between themselves, so then they increase security for a whole village. One reason might be that foreign troops left, because in some districts that are now insecure had presence of the foreign troops. But we don’t know... If it is just Taleban in a district, it will be possible for SCA to work, there will be some delays. But then there are two fighting, it will not be possible.”

Recalling some of the quotes from the section on the ISAF forces above suggests that ISAF in the north didn’t provide security but “at least managed to keep some control” (CDC focus group in Mazaar-e Sharif) and “Maybe not that they provided security, but they made people fear them so the commanders didn’t fight due to the fear or risk of international intervention.” (Focus group of NRM disability field supervisors)

Even though some discussions took place between SCA and the PRT, there was at the end never any conditions placed on SCA in terms of for example joint appearance or promotion of the Swedish PRT (as happened with American organisations in the example given above). However, and turning the coin, SCA staff presents a critique that Sweden didn't stand up for the humanitarian principles in general and the Geneva Convention in specific, when the situation became critical. With the repeated breach against the Geneva Convention made by international and Afghan troops, SCA saw no or little support from Sweden, including the Swedish embassy in Kabul (or the representation in Mazaar-e Sharif). Since Sweden is among the countries that usually stands up and defends the Convention, staff question whether the fact that Sweden was a part of ISAF made Sweden choose not to take a stand, taking the risk to be perceived to criticise their "own". Since the Afghan government is also perceived as not defending the humanitarian principles (see above), this left organisations, such as SCA and ICRC, threatened and vulnerable.

One KMO staff says: "Sweden's double chairs have been visible in regards to the hospital incidents and they have so far, until the last incident in Wardak, been very weak in their response and support for humanitarian principles protecting health. But if we compare the incidents in 2013 with the recent one in Wardak, there is a big difference. Margot Wallström went out immediately on Twitter, Isabella Lövin released a press release, which was more general but anyway. Anders Sjöberg, the new Swedish ambassador, has been supportive and even knocked on the door of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2013 the only thing that the embassy managed to do was to invite SCA and Afghan Health network to a meeting at the embassy. But now, Sweden wants to raise its profile in humanitarian issues. And now we have no military presence so it is probably easier for them to be more open in their critique. But it also shows the limitation of the double chairs... And of course it could be that it depends on the change of government as well..."

Staff also express that they expected not only for Sweden to stand up to defend for example health care in danger, but also to play a role in getting others on-board; a necessary action to end the attacks of national and foreign troops on health facilities. Not doing so, staff suggest, is one of the factors leading to failure in the international intervention. "If they have any hopes to win hearts and minds of Afghans, they should understand that the very basic things to do is to ensure health and education for their children. Otherwise there will never be any hearts and minds. And this can never be ensured by a short-term actor such as the military; it will never be a long term and that we have all known the whole time..."

Making impossible the development state?

As mentioned in several of the previous sections, SCA staff reflect considerably on what the long-term implications of the processes discussed above are. As one KMO staff asks himself: "So how can we know what is below the surface, what this will contribute to in the long run, in the longer perspective?" The aim for Sweden's engagement in Afghanistan was "to strengthen Afghanistan's capacity to maintain stability and security, democracy and human rights, and to offer its citizens possibilities to improve their living conditions and a just and sustainable development." (GoS 2010: 2, translation from Swedish by author) However, a large share of the quotes above suggest that this might not have been neither the aim in practice, neither the outcome, given the corruption, lack of capacity created, the fragile state of the state institutions, as well as economic decline having an impact in people's lives.

Below follows a longer excerpt from an interview with an SCA KMO staff, highlighting this broader and more long-term picture, linking it to several of the topics discussed above.

“I believe that to the population it has become increasingly unclear who does things, and who funds them. They just know that it is not the government... It is an NGO or a PRT or NSP... They have never seen the government coming to build a school. So we can see that the donors that always wanted to see a very minimal developmental state has succeeded. The state is simply a policy maker, but a not a policy implementer. The state had to some extent a role within NSP, but who the communities saw in implementation was mostly NGOs, like SCA and DACAAR... The PRTs managed to take many of the tasks that the government and the state should have taken on. They have almost no visibility...

[...] in relation to BPHS and EPHS. One could accept that they were needed, in the form of being outsourced to organisations for a certain period of time, but there is no sign of shift towards increased government responsibility. As an NGO, we have a role to show new ways of doing things, to push for change. But the big donors and the military interests and actors have managed to push for the idea of a minimalist state. And NGOs don't say much about it.

In this country there is a long history of the difficulty for the central government to find its role beyond or outside the two-three biggest cities. But we can see how especially in key sectors such as health and education there is a distortion. The military interests and the approaches have been successful in promoting structural changes. [...] ⁸

Since actors such as SCA and DACAAR implement government programmes such as NSP, the government becomes anonymous in the countryside. I don't believe that this is what Afghanistan needs. I believe it needs rather the opposite. If we talk about winning hearts and minds – it should be the Afghan government that should be given the opportunities to win those, that should have been given resources to deliver. To claim that it is the international and domestic military that should win hearts and minds is really egoistic and short-sighted... It is COIN... [...]

Firstly, we always say that there is no capacity within the state, but how could that ever be created if no or little resources are allocated. Secondly, NGOs are not impartial in this discussion because many of us need more contracts, there are contradictory interests within NGOs. With the phase-out of NSP, some NGOs lose around 60 per cent of their budget, so of course that is a disaster. And then we lobby for our own role in the following Citizen's Charter⁹. It is the same thing with education... And then we never raise a critical voice against the lack of involvement of the State...”

Below, some quotes exemplifying the absence of the central Afghan state in people's lives, including the lack of trust placed in it. It is largely described as a corrupt military state with little or no other functions in people's lives.

⁸ The person also presents criticism against SCA saying that: “I find it strange that SCA hasn't raised that, given the background of the movement in Sweden, where we come from, where a large share of the members come from. We should be on the people's side, and one would think that that implied that the state has a role to play. It is unclear why SCA never during these last decade never raised that critical issue.”

⁹ Partly a continuation of NSP programme. An initiative by the National Unity Government, the Charter will guarantee a minimum set of core services to all citizens, using CDCs as the primary vehicle for that service delivery.

“Afghan people believe in their national forces because they have no choice. They have experience many others and they were as well not good. Taleban, foreign occupation and nothing was good. People in Afghanistan have no other choice but to trust in Government. They cannot trust in Taleb, the European and international forces they closed down. We can just be hopeful of Allah, just Allah. Now the international forces have left once more, like they did in 91-92, here it will not be safe, and they will go to Europe. The international forces should have helped the ANSF. People in Afghanistan are living here like hostages. Nothing is changing. Yesterday the father was employer, today the son is employer and tomorrow the nephew will be the employer. But the people are still hostage.” (Focus group of disability programme field supervisors at NRM0)

“But people here trust the local government, that the government will be able to protect people. Every province should have an Atha, a governor that provides security and don’t let bad things happen in their community.” (Focus groups of teachers at CRDC in Mazaar-e Sharif)

“In many places the ALP creates more problems than contributing to a solution, they are the contact surface between the State and the local population and they are not doing a good job, sometimes helping the Taliban through the lack of trust they have with the population.” (KMO security staff)

“Kabul has become like a prison with corridors of cement walls. Just look at what is happening at the MOPH with the high concrete walls. People feel like they are living in a prison state, and that is not safety. Everywhere these concrete walls are taking a little bit of the street, of the pavements, we can almost not move in the city anymore.” (KMO health programme staff)

In interviews with SCA health staff and target groups, the quality of SCA run clinics, compared to government clinics, is several times raised. In Wardak, various interviewees are proud to say that people come from Kabul to get treatment in Wardak. A focus group of midwives and doctors Wardak says: “People come from Kabul to get treatment here. The services are better than in the government hospital in Kabul, the medicine is free, in Kabul they have to buy it in the bazaar, and they get food while they are in the hospital. People are poor so these things are important to them.” I ask why is it better at SCA. “SCA management is better and also corruption is less present. Everything is different, also the way we work. And we work more, longer days, we have less leave and less maternity leave.”

While it could from an SCA perspective be seen as positive that SCA hospitals have a good reputation, it is questionable whether the lack of trust in government facilities is something that will benefit SCA and, more importantly, the people of Afghanistan in the long-term perspective.

The cases with the clinics also illustrate another dimension of the role of the state. As mentioned above, SCA as well as other organisations providing health services, see little or no support from government. When asked whether it is possible to pressure the government to respect and defend health facilities, response has been weak or directly against. One CRMO administrative staff comments that the military and police enter as they want into the hospital. “There is no law here.” SCA staff and target groups appear convinced that the interests and perspectives of the ministries responsible for security, including defence and domestic affairs, are “above” all the others. One SCA health staff in Wardak says: “We are in contact with the provincial government, PHD and MOPH about all these incidents but they don’t have any power over security forces.

Even the governor has nothing to say about them. Also some people just want to protect themselves and they don't want to criticise the security forces."

The same person says: "There is a general problem with having clinics close to check-points and sub-governors' houses. Women don't come. For example in Miran, the clinic was closed for three months in 2012 and then now since October 2015. Taliban warned us and said please close the clinic because it is too close to the sub-governor's office and we have to attack that so we will not allow our women and children to go to that clinic. We have raised the issue with the government but they just postpone and postpone. We said to the community that we could move but that they had to give us another house, so they did. But now the government doesn't allow us to move the clinic, they say that it will be in Taliban area. But we have so many clinics in Taliban area... And now we have a problem with the auditors and with MOPH because we have costs for the clinic that is closed. The staff is working, either in outreach in the community or in other clinics, and we try to do the work. But there is no clinic. We see no other option than relocation. We have tried to make the sub-governor's house move but then the government says that that requires a decision from Ghani and that will not happen. So I guess we have to close it..." When asked why it so difficult for MOPH to be heard, to defend health? "They try to raise their voice but have no power. They even showed us the reaction they sent to the other ministries regarding the incidents. No other ministry can put pressure on the ministry of defence, national security. And locally it is difficult to influence, for example with the last incident, that wasn't even coordinated with ANSF locally."

Recalling one of the quotes from the focus group with midwives and doctors, also in Wardak: "People in the mountains have a relationship with Talibans, and the government forces or the government has never done anything for them. They are not included in any programme, they are excluded. But everyone just wants security."

The quotes from the previous sections suggest that even in areas that appeared stable, there was no real peace and security; simply an absence of violence due to a possible threat from the international forces. The lack of capacity developed within the ANSF, the dramatic increase in corruption, the economic collapse in the aftermaths of the international (troop) withdrawal, and the little or no presence and legitimacy of (a possible) development state responsible for ensuring its citizens' access to basic services, leave interviewed SCA staff and target groups with little hope for the future and with a scepticism in regards to the international community's interest in the well-being of the Afghan people once more severely damaged. One of the disability programme field supervisor in Mazaar-e Sharif said during the focus group discussion: "Now the international forces have left once more".

A study on international support to Afghan civil society initiates with the following quote: "Help from the international community has consisted of walking together up a mountain, but then being abandoned there." (Winter 2010¹⁰)

¹⁰ "Muslim Mudassir Muslim was the Monitoring and Evaluation Co-ordinator for Afghanaid in Ghor Province who died when the car in which he was travelling to work was hit by a US military vehicle, he left behind a wife and young daughter." (Winter 2010: 2)

5. Tentative answers to the questions

How has the presence of the international military forces in general, including the Swedish, influenced the short- and long-term conditions for SCA as an NGO to carry out development cooperation?

The conditions were influenced by the increased number of actors working in development as well as the blurring of lines between, for example, the military, private and civilian actors. The Quick-Impact Project, carried out by the PRTs to win the Hearts and minds of the Afghan people blurred the line between military and humanitarian intervention. It is argued that the name of NGO was abused since everyone could call themselves an NGO, whether private, military or actually a non-governmental and non-profit actor.

It became increasingly important for SCA to be transparent and accountable with target groups and other actors and to show that it didn't negotiate the humanitarian principles, including the one of impartiality. It has also been even more important for SCA to respect what is described as Afghan values, to prove that the organisation is always with the Afghan people.

On a short- as well as long-term basis, the increased corruption, and weakened trust will influence on the context in which SCA works, further underlining the need to work with transparency and accountability both in terms of systems and in relation to target group. Increased kidnappings of SCA local staff is used to exemplify that increased difficulty for SCA to be separated from other actors who might be seen as, or linked to, warring parties in some regions. However, the fact that SCA kidnapped staff has always been released when their origin is made clear, proves that SCA has managed to maintain its legitimacy and strong identity in the communities.

The volatile and unpredictable security situation sets the conditions for all SCA operation, as it has done for the major part of the years that SCA has been operating in Afghanistan. See also answer to the last question below.

How has the relationship of the SCA staff with its targets groups been influenced by the international military presence?

Due to the active stand not to collaborate with military actors and not to accept American funding, as well as staying faithful to and defending the humanitarian principles, it appears that SCA's relation with the target groups have not been significantly influenced. However, NGOs enjoy less trust from community and will probably continue to do so. SCA's history and past in Afghanistan probably mitigated possible damages in the relation with the target group. See also the response on the previous as well as the following question.

Can something be said about how the international military presence has influenced the target groups vis-à-vis trust in development actors in general, including SCA, International organisations in general and the Afghan state.

In regards to SCA, the question has largely been answered above; little change can be verified in the trust between SCA and its target group. If any, it is positive since SCA has been able to show in practice that it didn't compromise with its principles, but stood firm. With a great share of the other development actors leaving and SCA making long-term promises, the trust is further

enhanced. The SCA slogan *You can trust on us is, We will stay as long as we are needed* contains a strong message.

At an overall level, depending on how to limit “development actors”, the trust appears to have been, at least in some places, severely damaged. As mentioned above, NGO was used by anyone who liked, including organisations with military and profit interests which has influenced how people look upon, and place their trust in, NGOs in general.

Many development actors that arrived after 2001, especially but not exclusively those who are related to USA, are perceived as involved as well as governed by political and military interests. It seems that the communities have realised that little can be taken for granted in terms of the underlying interests of development actors, many of them being “puppets” in military strategies.

In regards to the trust and relationship between the target group and the Afghan state, interviews (as well as the referred Survey) relate that the Afghan state is largely absent in the target groups lives in terms of assuring basic services and overall development. Target groups rely on other, mostly external actors, to care for education and health services; they rarely see the state in front on these. The state is to some extent present through the ANSF, although they enjoy varied and many times low legitimacy among the population.

In terms of trust more in general in the communities and in society, it is expressed that it has been damaged by the way that the international intervention, including its development part, has been carried out, breaking down relations of trust and mutual support. The long-term implications of this are difficult to predict, but decisive for the country’s future.

Did they experience any major changes in ISAF attitude towards civil society over the time between 2002-2012 – that somehow influenced the above issues? If so, any time frame, reason?

It has not been possible to observe any general trends in terms of changes over time. Probably, the sample would have had to be bigger and systematically selected based on time periods to find these differences. Attempts were made during interviews to explicitly ask for changes over time but informants expressed that it would be difficult to make such an analysis. The reality is pending back and forth and general trends have, according to them, not been experienced. In qualitative interviews, we rely on people’s stories and they way they tell them. However, studies like the Survey of the Afghan people offer some input, although that focuses on “the other side”; how ISAF (among other security actors) is viewed. (See attachment 3.)

According to their experience, how did ISAF presence influence their security/security of the programs of SCA?

At a general level, many informants believe that the ISAF presence didn’t play much of a difference. They worked in different geographic areas and many projects had no contact with the forces. However, where ISAF was presence the experience is mixed. The most positive experience appears to have been in the north, while the harshest critique is presented in central and eastern Afghanistan. However, in no place it is confirmed that peopled relied on international forces for their security, but that has rather been guaranteed by others, not the least local stakeholders.

The argument sometimes used by ISAF that it was protecting education, and especially for girls, is not at a general confirmed in the interviews. Health programmes stands out as the by far most

severely damaged by the presence of international military forces, constituting real threats to health facilities through repeated violations of the Geneva Convention.

During the interviews, no direct violations or intrusions by the Swedish forces were reported. However, SCA staff express disappointment with Sweden's lame response in regards to the attacks by Afghan and international forces on health facilities. It expected a stronger stance from Sweden in the health care in danger debate, something that didn't happen.

How would they, and in their perception the general public, differentiate between different nationalities in the force present where they were?

Simplified and summarised America stands out as the by far most negative example while Turkey stands out as the positive one, mostly due to the fact of it being another Muslim country, despite being a member of NATO. The rest of the countries, including Sweden, are seen as more or less the same. There are however, in the accounts of the informants, less examples of violations and bad relationship to local communities mentioned in the north, in comparison to the east and the central regions of Afghanistan.

If the person interviewed has worked as program manager on a higher level regionally: Was there any initiative for collaboration or exchange locally from ISAF or PRT? What?

Discussions and some information sharing took place with the PRT in Mazaar-e Sharif. However, after negotiations, the agreement was that no joint projects or events would be carried out. SCA staff believe that it was decisive for the negotiations with the PRT that there was civilian representatives present, hence this was very appreciated. At times, the PRT and the Swedish Embassy wanted a closer relation with joint activities and information sharing, something that SCA declined due to the principle of impartiality. This decision on no collaboration including no joint events, such as inaugurations, has support from all interviewed SCA staff and target groups. They believe that if SCA would have been seen as closer to the Swedish PRT, this would have had serious implications on the organisation's opportunities to operate in Afghanistan.

In the other locations (outside the area of the Swedish PRT) where SCA operated, there was no direct contact with the PRTs, except from for example provincial coordination meetings, organised by the government, where SCA and the PRTs, among other actors, were present. This was a conscious decision, which enjoys unanimous support from all interviewed staff and target groups.

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Interviewed persons (in the order they were interviewed)

Khalid Fahim and Fawad Sultani, Programme Department KMO, 22 March 2016

Mohammad Akbar Zadran, Rural Development, KMO, 22 March 2016

Humayon Safi, Health Programme Manager, KMO, 22 March 2016

Mohammad Amin Qanet, Disability Programme Manager, KMO 22 March 2016

Merissa Espenelli, Civil Society and Capacity Development Manager, KMO 22 March 2016

Najeebullah Ahmadzai, Office Administrator, and Abdul Ahad Samoon, Head of Office, ERMO, 23 March 2016

Akram Abdul Rahimzai, Education Project Manager, ERMO 23 March 2016

Sultan Mohammad Nasari, Disability Project Manager, ERMO, 23 March 2016

Bashir Ahmed, engineer, Rural Development Programme, ERMO 23 March 2016

Shafiqullah Kamawi, Capacity Development and Method Coordinator), ERMO, 24 March 2016

Focus group female teachers from Daman school (two female), ERMO, 24 March 2016

Focus group parents and SMC members from Daman and She Khan (four males), ERMO 24 March 2016

Focus group students from Daman Middle School (two female, two male), ERMO 24 March 2016

Jörgen Holmström, Country Director, KMO2, 25 March 2016

Amir Mohammad Ahmadi, Administrative Assistant, NRMO, 26 March 2016

Fahim Wahidi, acting CGLP Project Manager, NRM0, 26 March 2016

Ajmal Bakhar, site engineer and Kamila Nayiby, Master Trainer CGLP, NRM0, 26 March 2016

Focus group CDC members from CCC and CCC, (two female, two male), NRM0 26 March 2016

Najeebullah Yazdan Panah, Disability Project Manager, NRM0, 27 March 2016

Focus group CRDC teachers (one male and one female teacher), Mazaar-e Sharif, 27 March 2016

Parwana Sana Samudi, president of female DPO, Mazaar-e Sharif, 27 March 2016

Focus group DPOs AAB and BHIA, (3 female, 3 male), NRM0, 27 March 2016

Focus group SCA disability field supervisors, (4 female, 1 male), NRM0, 27 March 2016

Hayatullah Haidari, Security Manager, KMO, 28 March 2016

Kamela Sair, Health Programme Senior Officer, KMO, 28 March 2016

Shafiullah Sharafi, Head of Office, CRMO, 29 March 2016

Halima Assadi, Physiotherapist, CRMO, 29 March 2016

Zabiullah, Physiotherapist, CRMO, 29 March 2016

Ghulam Nabi, Office Administrator, CRMO, 29 March 2016

Dr. Dauran, Director of Wardak Provincial Hospital, 29 March 2016

Focus group of midwives and doctors, (2 female, 2 male), Wardak Prov. Hospital, 29 March 2016

Focus group members of Health Shura from CCC, CRMO, 30 March 2016

Abdul Wakil Ziar, BPHS Project Manager, CRMO, 30 March CRMO

Aminulhaq Mayel, Education Programme Manager, KMO, 31 March 2016

Serajuddin Joya, Human Right and Gender Senior Officer, KMO, 31 March 2016

Attachment 1: Terms of Reference

SCA experience on civilian-military interaction and consequences of the military intervention on aid delivery – an input to the Swedish Government’s Evaluation of Sweden’s engagement in Afghanistan¹¹

Brief background

On the 9th of July 2015, the Swedish Government decided that Sweden’s engagement in Afghanistan during the period 2006-2014 should be evaluated. The engagement entails different actors including the military, police, bi- and multilateral aid agencies, ministry of foreign affairs, as well as civil society organisations such as Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA). The evaluation aims to document lessons learned for future international engagements.

¹¹ Kommittédirektiv 2015:79 Utvärdering av Sveriges engagemang i Afghanistan.

SCA, as one of the key Swedish actor in Afghanistan, will be consulted during the various stages of the evaluation, to be finalized 30th of November 2016. At the SCA board meeting 5-6th of September 2015 it was discussed how the organization best could contribute as early as possible in order to influence the proceeding of the evaluation in some areas of special concern. Also, SCA with its field staff can make Afghan voices being heard. One area of special concern is civil military cooperation. This led to a proposal to make a minor study on this topic, to give a qualitative input to the evaluation. This document briefly outlines this idea.

Main questions for SCA and their relation the Swedish evaluation

Two of the tasks of the Swedish evaluation are to:

- Describe and analyse how the implementation of the overall engagement has worked over time, with a special focus on coordination and collaboration between development aid and military, taking into consideration gender equality.
- Describe and analyse the coordination and collaboration between Swedish authorities and Afghan authorities, other nations, international organisations, military, civil and local actors.

Taking this as a point of departure, the present minor SCA study is suggested to give input to the following questions:

- How has the presence of the international military forces in general, including the Swedish , influenced the short- and long-term conditions for SCA as an NGO to carry out development cooperation?
- How has the relationship of the SCA staff with its targets groups been influenced by the international military presence?
- Can something be said about how the international military presence has influenced the target groups vis á vis trust in development actors in general, including SCA, International organisations in general and the Afghan state.
- Did they experience any major changes in ISAF attitude towards civil society over the time between 2002-2012 – that somehow influenced the above issues? If so, any time frame, reason?
- According to their experience, how did ISAF presence influence their security/security of the programs of SCA?
- How would they, and in their perception the general public, differentiate between different nationalities in the force present where they were?
- If the person interviewed has worked as program manager on a higher level regionally: Was there any initiative for collaboration or exchange locally from ISAF or PRT? What?

For the above questions where relevant: How do they analyse changes over time? The scope of the questions is comprehensive, to say the least. It is however underlined that the present study only will give some insights into these questions, with the aim to stimulate further discussion and investigation by the Swedish evaluation.

Methodology

The study will use semi-structural qualitative interviews with around 20 persons from different functions within SCA programmes. The interviews will depart from the persons' own work experience and from there move on to more analytical questions, including on possible future scenarios. The reason to sample from SCA programmes is due to trust and timing but also due to relevance; SCA staff has relevant experience to be able to give an input to the questions asked. The majority of the sample will be from the areas where the Swedish military was present, in order to align with the Swedish evaluation. Interviews will also be carried out with some Kabul based staff. Both staff working in SCA offices, such as managers and coordinators, and project staff, such as teachers, doctors and midwives, will be interviewed. The study will take into account existing literature but the main focus, and hence effort, will be on the information gathered from the interviews. The approach departs from the wealth of knowledge and experience that the Afghan staff of SCA represents.

Planning & timeline

Travel to Afghanistan is scheduled 20th-2nd of April 2016. The consultant should send a draft report to SCA by the 10th of April, SCA will comment until the 14th of April. A final version will be sent on the 23th of April.

Contact persons, responsibilities and costs


The SCA counterparts for this study are Mr Jens Rosback, SMO and Mr Jörgen Holmström, KMO (facilitation/coordination) and Ms Anna-Karin Johansson.

The study is commissioned by ACU at SCA. All costs for professional fees, travel, accommodation and insurance are covered by SCA. Other costs are covered after approval by SGS, SCA.

Kabul Management Office is responsible for facilitating meetings with respondents of the study, either on the location of the respondents, or if the security do not allow, in Kabul.

Stockholm 2016-03-18

Attachment 2: Map of Afghanistan including SCA presence



Attachment 3: Perceptions of problems, security and economic development

All the tables and info-graphics below are taken from The Asia Foundation's *A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan 2015*.




Figure 1: Biggest problems, national level (page 23)

Question asked: In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole?




Figure 2: Biggest problems, local level (page 25)

Question asked: In your view what are the biggest problems in your local area?

| LEVEL OF FEAR BY ACTIVITY | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------|------|---------------|---------------|------|---------------|------------------------|-------|---------------------|
| | CENTRAL / KABUL | EAST | SOUTH EAST | SOUTH WEST | WEST | NORTH EAST | CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT | NORTH | NATIONAL AVERAGE |
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| VOTING IN A NATIONAL / PROVINCIAL ELECTION | 46 | 61 | 68 | 69 | 69 | 42 | 32 | 57 | 56 |
| PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION | 55 | 75 | 76 | 81 | 77 | 67 | 55 | 74 | 69 |
| RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE | 64 | 77 | 79 | 78 | 76 | 77 | 52 | 76 | 73 |
| ENCOUNTERING ANP | 32 | 54 | 51 | 66 | 58 | 39 | 27 | 41 | 45 |
| ENCOUNTERING ANA | 28 | 51 | 46 | 64 | 54 | 35 | 30 | 41 | 42 |
| TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY | 78 | 73 | 86 | 80 | 83 | 79 | 72 | 80 | 80 |
| ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN MILITARY FORCES ONLY) | 74 | 84 | 86 | 86 | 80 | 77 | 60 | 83 | 79 |
| ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN | 90 | 91 | 94 | 88 | 91 | 94 | 94 | 96 | 92 |

Figure 3: Level of fear by activity (page 36)

Question asked: Please, tell me, how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (percentage who say “some fear” or “a lot of fear”)




Figure 4: Perceptions of the ANA (page 44)

Question asked: I’m going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANA soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people, b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan (percentage of respondents who “strongly agree”)




Figure 5: Perceptions of the ANP (page 45)

Question asked: I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (percentage of respondents who say "strongly agree")




Figure 6: Sympathy for armed opposition groups (page 49)

Question asked: Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups? (percentage of respondents who say they have "a lot" or "a little" sympathy)




Figure 7: Sympathy for armed opposition groups: By province (page 50)

Question asked: Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups? (percentage of respondents who say they have “a little” or “a lot” of sympathy)




Figure 8: Economic indicators: Better household situation (page 57).

Question asked: Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your households has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following?)




Figure 9: Perception of who provides security in local area (page 43)

Question asked: There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar? (percentage of respondents who identify each group)

Attachment 4: Visiting Schedule

Visiting schedule for Ms Kajsa Johansson, Board Member SCA (Mar 21st – Mar 31st 2016)
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draft I

| Date | Weekday | Name | Position/ Meeting | Meeting Timing | Meeting Venue | Location | Remarks | Status of the meetings |
|--------|-----------|-----------------------------------|---|----------------------|----------------------|-----------|---|---------------------------|
| Mar 21 | Monday | Departure to Afghanistan | | | | | | |
| Mar 22 | Tuesday | Dr Khalid Fawad Sultani | Programme Director Deputy Programme Director | 08.30-09.30 hours | Director office room | KMO | Discuss Programme Department | Confirmed |
| | | Humayon Safi | Health Manager | 09.40-10.10 hours | Manager room | KMO | Discuss development and activities in health programme | Confirmed |
| | | Akbar Zadran | RDP Manager | 11.00-11.30 hours | Manager room | KMO | Discuss development and activities in rural development programme | Confirmed |
| | | Amin Qanet | DP Manager | 11.40-12.15 hours | Manager room | KMO | Discuss development and activities in disability programme | Confirmed |
| | | Lunch | | 12.30-01.30 hours | Dining hall | KMO | | |
| | | Merissa | CCU Manager | 02.20-02.50 hours | Manager room | KMO | Discuss development and activities in unit | Confirmed |
| Mar 23 | Wednesday | Departure to Jalalabad in morning | | | | | | |
| | | M. Akram Abdul Rahimzai | Education Manager | 01.30-02.00 hours | Manager room | Jalalabad | Discuss development and activities in Education projects | Confirmed |

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------|----------|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|---|------------------|
| | | Sultan Mohammad Nasari | DP Manager | 02.10-02.40 hours | <i>Manager room</i> | Jalalabad | Discuss development and activities in DP projects | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| | | Bashir Ahmed | Engineering Senior Officer | 02.50-03.20 hours | <i>Manager room</i> | Jalalabad | Discuss development and activities in Engineering projects | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| Mar 24 | Thursday | Abdul Ahad Samoon | Head of ERMO | 08.00-08.30 hours | <i>Head room</i> | Jalalabad | Discuss the programmes and challenges in activities and projects | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| | | Teachers | Meeting | 08.40-09.40 hours | <i>Meeting room</i> | Jalalabad | | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| | | Parents | Meeting | 09.50-10.50 hours | <i>Meeting room</i> | Jalalabad | | |
| | | Group of students | Meeting | 11.00-12.00 hours | <i>Meeting room</i> | Jalalabad | | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| | | Lunch | | 12.30-01.30 hours | <i>Dining hall, ERMO</i> | Jalalabad | | |
| | | <i>Departure to Kabul in afternoon</i> | | | | | | |
| Mar 25 | Friday | Jörgen Holmström Country Director KM03 11.30 hours <i>Departure to Mazar e Sharif</i> | | | | | | |
| Mar 26 | Saturday | Fahim Wahidi | Acting CGLP Manager | 08.00-08.20 hours | <i>Manager room</i> | Mazar | | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| | | Site Engineers | Meeting | 08.30-10.00 hours | <i>Engineering room</i> | Mazar | | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| | | CDC Members (Male, female) | Meeting | 10.30-12.30 hours | <i>Field</i> | Mazar | | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| Mar 27 | Sunday | Najeebullah Yazdanpanah | DP Manager | 08.00-08.20 hours | <i>Manager room</i> | Mazar | | <i>Confirmed</i> |
| | | DPO | Meeting | 08.30-10.30 hours | <i>DPO office</i> | Mazar | | <i>Confirmed</i> |

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------|-----------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------|--|-----------|
| | | Teachers | Meeting | 11.00-01.00 hours | ? | Mazar | | Confirmed |
| | | Students | Meeting | 01.30-03.30 hours | ? | Mazar | | Confirmed |
| Mar 28 | Monday | <i>Departure to Kabul</i> | | | | | | |
| | | Hayatullah Haidari | Security Coordinator | 08.30- 9.30 hours | Coordinator room | KMO | | Confirmed |
| | | Dr. Kamela | Senior Officer Health | 13.30-14.30 hours | Officer room | KMO | | Confirmed |
| Mar 29 | Tuesday | Physiotherapists | Health Manager | 09.30-10.00 hours | Manager room | Wardak | | Confirmed |
| | | Midwives | Meeting | 10.15-12.15 hours | ? | Wardak | | Confirmed |
| | | Doctors | Meeting | 01.30-03.00 hours | ? | Wardak | | Confirmed |
| Mar 30 | Wednesday | Abdul Wakeel Ziar | Meeting | 09.30-10.30 hours | ? | Wardak | | Confirmed |
| | | Health Shuras | Meeting | 11.00-12.30 hours | ? | Wardak | | Confirmed |
| | | Karimullah Wardak | Acting NSP Manager | 01.30-02.00 hours | Manager room | Wardak | | Confirmed |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | CDC Members (male, female) | Meeting | 02.10-03.00 hours | ? | Wardak | | Confirmed |
| Mar 31 | Thursday | Aminulhaq Mayel | Education Manager | 08.00-08.30 hours | Manager room | KMO | | Confirmed |
| | | Serajuddin Joya | Gender Senior Officer | 09.00-10.00 hours | Manager room | KMO | | Confirmed |
| | | <i>Kabul Follow up Meetings</i> | | | | | | |

| | | |
|-------|----------|---------------------|
| Apr 1 | Friday | Departure to Sweden |
| Apr 2 | Saturday | Arrival Stockholm |